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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagination alone offers me some intimation of what can be.
-Andre Breton'
In contemporary Western society, women's unique ability to be-
come pregnant has been used as a justification for numerous and
diverse discriminatory practices against women. As a result, women
have been excluded from public life,2 penalized by the criminal jus-
tice system,' and even physically controlled and invaded4 because of
their biological difference from men. The pervasiveness of this deni-
grating cultural and legal approach to pregnancy persists despite
positive changes in other areas of the law regarding women's sexual
autonomy and equality.' This article asks feminists to imagine how
the law might be different, and true gender equality be obtained, if
both men and women were considered equal contributors to fetal
health and the law no longer subordinated the goal of gender equal-
ity to the goal of fetal health.
To a large extent, the feminist approach to the pregnancy problem
has focused on securing and preserving the abortion right as a means
of promoting women's reproductive autonomy and equality. This ar-
ticle argues that feminists should be skeptical about the efficacy of
making abortion the rallying point it has become because the abor-
tion right, as it exists today, has limited potential to enhance
women's substantive equality. Making abortion the central issue may
impede women's chances for equality because it detracts from other
1. MANIFESTOSOFSURREALISM (1969).
2. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961) (holding that exclusion of women from
jury duty is reasonable because women are the "center of home and family life"); Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 58 (1981) (holding that men and women are not similarly situated for
purposes of the draft because of combat restrictions imposed on women by Congress); Kather-
ine M. Skiba, Women Take the Reins in Madison and Dave County Governments, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTREL, Apr. 16, 1997, at 5 (reporting that women are holding leadership positions in the
county for the first time).
3. See Heather Sprintz, The Criminalization of Perinatal AIDS Transmission, 3 HEALTH
MATRIX 495, 496 (1993) (observing that criminal penalties for transmitting the HIV virus do
not exclude transmission to a fetus from the mother).
4. See Roberta Cepko, Involuntary Sterilization of Mentally Disabled Women, 8 BERKELEY
WOMEN's LJ. 122, 162 (1993) (discussing society's attempt to control mentally disabled
women's reproduction).
5. See, e.g., California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (holding
state-mandated pregnancy leave is not discriminatory); Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 63-69 (1986) (finding that "hostile environment" sexual harassment is a form of sex dis-
crimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); FED. R. EVID. 412 (limiting
admissibility of a rape victim's sexual history, as well as reputation and opinion evidence con-
cerning the victim).
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important issues facing women, namely, the pregnancy problem-
discriminatory treatment of pregnant women by society and the crimi-
nal justice system. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly,
feminist rhetoric about abortion has largely failed to acknowledge
the moral issues surrounding abortion.6 This failure has ultimately
damaged the feminist cause by oversimplifying this complex issue
and alienating many supporters in the process. Because the abortion
right is only one component of women's equality, this article urges
feminist legal scholars to change the scope of their analysis from se-
curing and preserving the abortion right to the broader issue of
exposing the underlying fallacies supporting state power to dispro-
portionately regulate female reproduction.
This article suggests an alternate approach to the current feminist
analysis of reproductive rights. The ideas presented in this article are
intended to initiate an intra-feminist dialogue about the pregnancy
problem in order to move the issue beyond the traditional privacy
and equal protection analyses commonly applied.
First, this article analyzes the paradoxical abortion right and its
limited usefulness to women's struggle for equal treatment under the
law. Next, the article provides examples of ways society arbitrarily
burdens women, but not men, in relation to their respective biologi-
cal reproductive capacities and discusses how such differential
treatment negatively impacts women's chances of achieving equal
power. Finally, this article proposes an alternate approach to the
pregnancy problem. Specifically, the article argues that both men
and women are reproductive beings that should be treated equally
regarding their reproductive abilities. Therefore, under this ap-
proach, prior to the conception of a fetus, the state may not regulate
male and female reproductive capacities disparately because, in fact,
their reproductive contributions are equal. After conception, any
state regulation of pregnancy must be based solely on the well-being
of the mother, instead of fetal health, because placing a pregnant
woman's rights in conflict with those of her fetus undermines
women's autonomy and equality. Rather than focusing on abortion,
this approach attempts to reconceptualize the issue as one involving
the state's right to regulate both male and female reproductive abili-
ties, regardless of the form of that ability.
6. See generally Naomi Wolf, Our Bodies, Our Souls: Rethinking Pro-Choice Rhetoric THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Oct. 16, 1995, at 26 (encouraging recognition of the moral issues involved in the
choice of whether to abort).
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Because it is likely that women will continue to become pregnant
unintentionally or require abortions for other reasons, abortion
rights must be safeguarded and enforced in a meaningful way.7
Therefore, this article also considers the nature of fetal life and what
justifications, if any, feminists can legitimately provide for state in-
volvement in a woman's pregnancy.
I. THE ABORTION CONUNDRUM
A. The SingularAbortion Right
To say that feminists should not continue to focus primarily on
women's right to abortion is not to say that abortion is inconsequen-
tial to women's struggle for equal status under the law. The right to
obtain an abortion is a critical component of women's equality be-
cause it enables women to exercise their free will regarding the
direction of their lives! For some women, abortion is "a window of
relief in an unequal situation from which there is no exit."9 But abor-
tion, as the right is currently defined, has negative consequences for
women as a group. The impact of abortion on women's lives is
probably more subtle and far reaching than contemporary feminist
rhetoric has recognized. For this reason, feminists should consider
adopting a more comprehensive approach to reproductive auton-
omy.
Approximately forty-three percent of American women will have at
least one abortion by the time they turn forty-five." Many of these
women will lie about their choice or simply not discuss it with the
7. According to one article, at least 60% of pregnancies in the United States are unin-
tended. See Sarah S. Brown & Leon Eisenberg, Unintended Pregnancy and the Well-Being of
Children and Famile, 274 JAMA 1332 (1995). Couples who use no contraception and those
whose contraception fails contribute equally to the number of unintended pregnancies. See id.
Women who become pregnant unintentionally are less likely to obtain prenatal care and are
more likely to use harnifud substances than those who became pregnant intentionally. See id.
Children who are the result of an unintended pregnancy are more likely to have low birth
weight, die in their first year, be abused, and have poor development. See id. The authors sug-
gest that, based on this evidence, medical practitioners and researchers should focus more
heavily on discovering ways to avoid unintended pregnancies, including developing contracep-
tive methods for men. See id.
8. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (arguing that the Court has recognized a
right of personal privacy in the U.S. Constitution).
9. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under the Law, 100 YALE LJ.
1281, 1315 (1991) (detailing ways in which society penalizes pregnant women and mothers).
10. See Mary Leonard, Abortion: 25 Years After Roe v. Wade, Middle Ground Is Battlefield, B.
GLoBE, Dec. 14, 1997, at F1, available in 1997 WL 6285653; Terry Nicole Steinberg, Abortion
Counseling. To Benefit MaternalHealth, 15 AM.J.L. & MED. 483,483 (1989).
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people closest to them." After having an abortion, women's emo-
tional responses range from grief for the fetus to suicidal
tendencies. Some women may experience this trauma immediately
after the abortion, while others might not experience trauma until
ten years later.3 Women who undergo second trimester abortions
experience more physical pain than women who abort in the first
trimester.4 Perhaps most significantly, women who obtain second
trimester abortions are more likely to perceive the fetus as a baby that
can and does feel pain. Obviously then, the choice to have an abor-
tion is more than a simple medical decision between a woman and
her doctor, as many "pro-choice" advocates have argued. Thus, the
abortion choice has serious implications for women's mental health,
especially considering the large number of women who choose abor-
tion. 6
Notwithstanding the fact that many women experience grief, guilt,
and a sense of loss after an abortion, 7 the Supreme Court of the
United States has concluded that a fetus is not a person for Four-
teenth Amendment purposes. Nonetheless, the Court reasoned, the
fetus is a "potential life" and thus worthy of protection." For this rea-
son, states may infringe upon a woman's fundamental right to receive
an abortion as long as the regulation does not pose an "undue bur-
den" on that right.
11. Seeidat484n.7.
12. See id. at 489-90 (using the word "grief" to include sadness, loss, and regret, as well as
anger, fear, and anxiety).
13. See id. at 490.
14. See id. at 492.
15. See id.
16. But see Alice A. Frye, et al., Induced Abortion in the United States: A 1994 Update, 49J. AM.
MED. WOmEN'S ASS'N 131, 135 (1994) (summarizing Surgeon General C. Everett Koop's con-
clusion in 1989 that research does not support the idea that abortion is dangerous to women's
mental health).
17. See supra text accompanying note 12.
18. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973) (stating a fetus is not a person within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Ronald M. Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights:
Whether and How Roe Should Be Overrued 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 381,398-402 (1992) (discussing the
constitutional status of fetal life). Professor Dworkin asserts that based on Roe, we can assume
that a fetus is not a constitutional person whose rights are in conflict with the pregnant woman.
See id. at 399. The Roe Court's analysis did not end there, however. The Court held that even
though the fetus is not a person with constitutionally protected rights, the state still has an in-
terest in protecting human life, and that the closer a woman comes to giving birth, the more
compelling this interest becomes. See Roe; 410 U.S. at 163 (articulating the original test for
permissible state involvement in abortion decisions).
19. See Roe; 410 U.S. at 150 (discussing potentiality of life); Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992) (characterizing a fetus as potential life).
20. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (enunciating the undue burden standard for abortion regula-
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Under this prevailing legal formulation of the abortion right, it
would seem that women who receive abortions must either convince
themselves that a fetus is not a life, or alternatively convince them-
selves that their own interests outweigh whatever interests the fetus
may have. On the other hand, if women successfully convince them-
selves of either of these ideas, or any other rationale, they may deny
themselves the right to grieve for their aborted fetus, compounding
the trauma experienced by the abortion itself. This denial leads to a
great deal of ambivalence among women about abortion rights, and
in turn, alienates some women from adopting the "pro-choice" view-
point."
Considered in this light, obtaining the "right" to receive an abor-
tion seems like a mixed blessing. Few other rights have such
profound moral and emotional impacts. Twenty-four years after
women won this right, feminists must consider whether they should
continue to focus on the abortion right in its current form or shift
the focus from protecting abortion rights to more fundamental
means of securing equal reproductive autonomy.
B. The Pregnancy Problem Illustrated
Women are subjugated based on their ability to become pregnant,
whether they actually can or do become pregnant, and whether they
carry a fetus to term. ' The legal inequalities illustrated below disad-
vantage women as a group, regardless of any individual woman's
desire or ability to become pregnant. There are no concomitant so-
cial or legal disadvantages to men as a group or to individual men
who impregnate women. If a woman becomes pregnant, she will
bear the burden of her decision to either terminate the pregnancy or
give birth. Assuming she does carry her pregnancy to term, her
pregnancy will expose her to legalized discrimination in the form of
tions). The Court's singular "undue burden" standard is reminiscent of the Court's "interme-
diate scrutiny" standard created to differentiate between racial classifications and gender
classifications. Compare Casey, 505 U.S. at 988 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (recognizing the undue burden standard as a constitutional anomaly), with Craig V.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that the state must only show that the gender classifi-
cation serves important government objectives and is rationally related to those objectives).
21. In fact, Norma McCorvey, who was "Jane Roe" in Roe v. Wade, recently denounced her
pro-choice stance due to her own conflicted feelings regarding abortion. See David Van Biema,
An Icon in Search Mode, TIME, Aug. 21, 1995, at 36; see generally Wolf, supra note 6, at 26 (advocat-
ing recognition of the moral issues surrounding the abortion choice).
22. SeeMacKinnon, supra note 9, at 1315-16 (arguing that women lose jobs or have a more
difficult time gaining employment because of the possibility that they might become preg-
nant).
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fetal protection laws, unavailability of workplace benefits such as
maternity leave, 4 and possibly even a forced cesarean section should
she become ill.' As a mother, she will bear primary or exclusive re-
sponsibility for raising the child,' be excluded from higher paying
jobs,"7 and may be forced to choose between a devalued role as
mother and pursuing other goals." If she is a drug user, she could
face criminal prosecution under a panoply of statutes enacted to pro-
tect fetal life from maternal drug useY If she is convicted of child
abuse, the court may order "compulsory contraception" as a condi-
tion of her probation."
23. See discussion infra Part Il.
24. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 requires private employers who engage in
interstate commerce and employ fifty or more employees each work day for at least twenty cal-
endar work-weeks in the preceding year to provide pregnant employees who give birth up to
twelve weeks of unpaid leave. See Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (Supp. V
1993). Companies with fewer than fifty employees account for 40% of the workforce. See Sabra
Craig, Note, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Survey of the Act's Histoy, Purposes, Provi-
sions, and Social Ramifications, 44 DRAKE L. REv. 51, 73-75 (1995) (discussing limitations of the
Family and Medical Leave Act). The Act has received much criticism for its limited applicabil-
ity and efficacy in meeting the goal of allowing mothers to bond with their newborn children.
See id.
25. See In reA.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1238 (D.C. 1990) (allowing a hospital to order a cesarean
section for a terminally ill pregnant woman);Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth.,
274 S.E.2d 457,458 (Ga. 1981) (authorizing the hospital to administer all medical procedures
deemed necessary to preserve the life of an unborn fetus); see also Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge
in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1951 (1986) (giving
a history of court-ordered cesarean section deliveries).
26. See Odeana R. Neal, Myths and Moms: Images of Women and Termination of Parental Rights,
5 KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61 (1995) (arguing that mothers have an "expectation" that they will
be responsible for raising their children); ARLIE HOCHSCHILD WITH ANNE MACHUNG, THE
SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 220-26 (1978).
27. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (pointing out that even the U.S. Con-
stitution does not demand equal employment opportunities for women).
28. One study reported that 90% of male business executives had children by age 40, while
only 35% of women executives did. See Ellen Debenport, Combining Careers, Children; Business,
Society Are Slow To Unhitch 'Mommy Track', ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 17, 1993, at 1C (dis-
cussing disparate statistics between male and female workers); see also D. Kelly Weisberg,
Professional Women and the Professionalization of Motherhood. Marcia Clark s Double Bind, 6 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 295, 322 (1995) (explaining that many women are forced to choose between
work and family life if they are unable to be both perfect mothers and good workers).
29. See Kary Moss, Substance AbuseDuringPregnany, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 278, 280 (1990)
(describing California prosecutors' use of a statute designed to protect children to prosecute a
mother for her drug use during pregnancy).
30. SeeJanet F. Ginzberg, Compulsory Contraception As a Condition of Probation: The Use and
Abuse of Norplant, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 979 (1992) (providing a history of courts' use of contracep-
tion as means of controlling reproductive rights). States, as well as courts, have developed
plans for using Norplant to control reproduction, especially that of poor women. One state
Governor proposed offering free Norplant to women who receive welfare, and has distributed
Norplant to inner-city high school students. Other states have offered money to women on
welfare to implant Norplant. See id.; see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who
Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality and Right of Privay, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991) (discuss-
ing specific threats of prosecution to women of color).
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On the other hand, if she terminates the pregnancy, she faces ex-
treme social stigmatization for her decision. Additionally, because
the state has an interest in fetal life that becomes compelling when
the fetus becomes viable, the state may significantly intrude on her
decision to abort." For instance, not only may the state attempt to
persuade her not to abort her fetus, but it may also implicitly ques-
tion the soundness of her decision by forcing her to wait twenty-four
hours before undergoing the procedure.2 The state may essentially
strip women of their once fundamental right to receive an abortion
by refusing to appropriate funds for abortions." If she is a teenager,
she may be required to acquire parental or judicial consent to obtain
an abortion.' Many women intuitively understand the threat these
restrictions pose to women's reproductive freedom, yet the legal sys-
tem has determined that they pose no "undue burden" and may
therefore be enforced by the state."
Each of these restrictions imposes another entity's judgment over
the woman's regarding her supposedly private decision to obtain an
abortion. Ajudge, a physician, or a parent is considered to have bet-
ter insight into a woman's decision to have an abortion than the
woman herself. It is hard to imagine a situation in which a man's re-
productive autonomy is compromised to a similar degree. Men are
simply left out of the equation-their role in conception has no legal
significance in the abortion context. In fact, the invisibility of the fa-
ther is exemplified by the fact that even the state has more power
than he to control the mother's decision to obtain an abortion."
31. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Kathryn Kolbert & An-
drea Miller, Government in the Examining Room: Restrictions on the Provision of Abortion, 49J. AM.
MED. WOMEN'S ASS'N 153, 153 (1994) (describing the nature and degree of state involvement
in abortion decisions after Casey).
32. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 881 (describing a Pennsylvania abortion statute that requires
women to wait 24 hours before receiving an abortion and requires doctors to provide informa-
tion about abortion alternatives). The waiting period was held not to be an undue burden. See
id. at 882.
33. SeeWebster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 490 (1989) (allowing a public hos-
pital to ban abortions even when women offered to pay with private funds); Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 329 (1980) (holding that states receiving Medicaid funds need not provide medi-
cally necessary abortions although they fund childbirth).
34. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 899 (upholding states' parental notification requirement); see, e.g.,
ARK. CODEANN. §§ 20-16-801, 20-16-803 (Michie 1989) (requiring a minor to provide her par-
ents with written notice of her intent to obtain an abortion); Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.028 (1996)
(requiring written consent from a parent, legal guardian, or through a court order before a
doctor may perform an abortion on a woman under 18 years old).
35. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 875-77 (applying the undue burden standard to abortion regula-
dons).
36. See id. at 895-96 (stating that fathers do not have the same cognizable and substantial
interest in their unborn children as they do in their living children); see also Kevin M. Apollo,
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III. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PREGNANT AND FERTILE WOMEN
A. Fetal Protection
States have advocated and carried out prosecutions of pregnant
women for ingesting illegal drugs and have denied pregnant or fer-
tile women access to certain types of employment based on a
commitment to protecting fetal life."' These two types of laws illus-
trate the inherent inequality of focusing societal resources and
coercion solely on pregnant women in the interest of fetal protec-
tion. In both areas of the law, women are conceptualized as either
actual or potential vessels for fetal life to justify states' proscription of
certain female conduct and states' involvement in the woman's preg-
nancy" It is true, of course, that women as a group are actual or
potential vessels for life. In this way, men and women are different.
Men do, however, have an indispensable role in human reproduc-
tion-men ejaculate sperm, contributing half of the fetus' genetic
material. Thus, in the same way that the state conceptualizes women
as actual or potential mothers, the state could also conceptualize men
as actual or potential fathers." This revelation could dramatically al-
ter the current positions of men and women relative to their
reproductive capacity.
1. Criminal Prosecution of Pregnant Women
If a woman uses drugs during her pregnancy, states may attempt to
prosecute her for child neglect or abuse.' In one well-publicized
The Biological Father's Right to Require a Pregnant Woman to Undergo Medical Treatment Necessary to
Sustain Fetal Life 94 DIcK. L. REv. 199, 217-22 (1989) (setting forth limitations on a father's in-
terest in his fetus).
37. See infra notes 41,76, 79-83 and accompanying text. Cf Reva Siegel, ReasoningFrom the
Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 261, 329-30 & n.282 (1992) (noting that until 1991, many employers sought to exclude
fertile women from work which was thought to threaten the welfare of future generations);
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (prohibiting fetal-protective regulation of
women's employment under the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964).
38. For an excellent discussion of the law's conceptualization of women as vessels for life,
see Elizabeth A. Reilly, The Rhetoric of Disrespect: Uncovering the Faulty Premises Infecting Reproduc-
tive Rights, 5 Ahi. UJ. GENDER & L. 147 (1996).
39. While technically the state could conceptualize a man as a potential father, very rarely,
if at all, has it done so for the purpose of punishing a man for fetal-harming behavior. See infra
note 66 and accompanying text.
40. See Wendy Chavkin, Nancy Walker, & Denise Paone, Drug Using Families and Child Pro-
tection: Results of a Study and Implications for Change, 54 U. P=Tr. L. REV. 295, 300-12 (1992)
(discussing the prosecution of pregnant women under various types of criminal statutes); Kris-
ten Barrett, ProsecutingPregnantAddictsforDealing to the Unborn, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 221, 237 (1991)
(providing a general history of states' attempts to criminalize certain prenatal maternal acts).
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case, the state prosecuted Jennifer Johnson under a felony statute
prohibiting the delivery of a controlled substance to a minor."' The
minor was Jennifer's fetus and the method of delivery was her um-
bilical cord.'
The Supreme Court of Florida found the lower court's interpreta-
tion of the statute contrary to rules of statutory construction and
reversed Jennifer Johnson's conviction.' The court also reasoned
that prosecuting pregnant drug users would dissuade these women
from seeking drug treatment and might even increase the incidence
of abortion." Inexplicably, though, the court noted in dictum that
the state's contention that the drugs were delivered through the um-
bilical cord was physiologically impossible because the placenta was
"not part of the mother's body."' The court did not expand upon
this proposition, but it apparently reasoned that for a mother to be
convicted of delivering drugs to a fetus she must have some sort of
physical control over the means of delivery.' If the placenta is not
part of the mother's body, presumably then, neither is the fetus.
As circular as this reasoning is, it does illustrate the legal fiction
courts must construct to prosecute women under such statutes. For
the prosecution to stand, the woman and the fetus must, by defini-
tion, constitute two separate entities with competing interests.
Otherwise, the only criminal sanctions a pregnant drug user faces are
the typical "victimless crime" statutes.47 Once the state establishes
States may also attempt to initiate civil probate proceedings against drug-addicted mothers. In
one case, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that courts can consider prenatal drug use by the
mother as probative evidence of neglect to establish probate court jurisdiction in a termination
of parental rights proceeding. See In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
The court opined that "a child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body." Id.
at 739 (citing Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222 (Mich. 1971)). Courts that use this
type of sweeping language in regard to fetal rights often do not consider the consequences of
such pronouncements. For instance, if a child has a right to be born with a "sound mind and
body," what type of remedy does a child have who is born brain damaged or physically handi-
capped through no "fault" of the mother or anyone else? The Baby X court also weighed a
mother's right to confidentiality regarding drug treatment against the best interests of the child
and held that the child won. See idat 739-41.
41. SeeJohnson v. State, 602 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 1992). The statute referred to is FLA. STAT.
ch. 893.13(1) (c) (1) (1989).
42. SeeJohnsan, 602 So.2d at 1290.
43. See id. at 1290,1296-97.
44. See id. at 1296.
45. Id. at 1292 (emphasis added).
46. See id. (noting that the only wayJohnson could have prevented the "delivery" of drugs
would have been to sever the umbilical cord before the child was born, which "of course, would
probably have killed both herself and her child").
47. A "victimless crime" is a crime that generally involves only the criminal and has no di-
rect victim, such as the crime of illegal possession of drugs. BLACK'S IAW DICIoNARY 1085 (6th
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that a fetus is a separate legal entity from the woman, the state may
then appoint itself as the fetal advocate because a fetus cannot speak
for itself. Thus, the fetus has the power of the state to protect its
state-defined interests, skewing the balance of power in its favor.
Although most attempts to prosecute pregnant women under simi-
lar statutes have proven unsuccessful,' one important point must be
considered. These prosecutions have generally failed based on judi-
cial reasoning that, as a matter of "common sense," the threat of
prosecution discourages women from obtaining prenatal care and
drug treatment and may even encourage abortion.' Therefore,
abandonment of prosecutions of pregnant drug users would be based
not on judicial concern for the equality of women but rather on pro-
tection of fetal life. While both may be worthwhile concerns, this
philosophical distinction has importance for the feminist agenda be-
cause public opinion regarding pregnant women's conduct toward
their fetuses could just as easily have swayed the court to uphold the
conviction.' That is, the court's decision was based on politics rather
than the law. A decision based on a commitment to women's equal
ed. 1991).
48. For a discussion of the history of prosecutions for harming a fetus, see Judith Kahn, Of
Woman's First Disobedience: Forsaking a Duty of Care to Her Fetus - Is This a Mother's Crime?, 53
BROOK. L. REv. 807,833-43 (1987).
49. SeeJeffery A. Pamess, Pregnant Dads: The Crimes and Other Misconduct of Expectant Fathers,
72 OR. L. REv. 901,909 (1993) (discussing the societal trend away from prosecution in favor of
rehabilitation and deterrence). Although the Johnson court considered itself to be applying
common sense, it missed one obvious problem with its holding- Jennifer Johnson and many
other women sought treatment during their pregnancies and discovered either that the waiting
lists were too long or that the programs expressly excluded pregnant women. SeeJanet PR Fink,
Effects of Crack and Cocaine on Infants: A Brief Review of the Literature, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 460,
463-64 (1990) (explaining that two-thirds of hospitals surveyed in 1989 had no drug treatment
programs to which pregnant patients could be referred, that one of the only residential
mother/child drug treatment programs in New York City has a several months-long waiting list,
and that of the few New York City programs accepting addicted women, less than half simulta-
neously provide prenatal care);Jean Reith Schroedel & Paul Peretz, A Gender Analysis of Polity
Formation: The Case ofFetalAbuse, 19J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y& L. 335, 338 (1994) (noting that less
than half of the newspaper articles published in the New York Times between 1989 and 1991
dealing with fetal abuse mentioned mitigating circumstances, such as lack of drug treatment
programs for pregnant women, that would support an argument against punishing the moth-
ers). Thus, it is not solely the threat of prosecution that prevents pregnant drug users from
seeking treatment, but also a simple lack of programs that are willing and able to accept them.
Accord Susan Diesenhouse, Drug Treatment Is Scarier Than Ever for Women, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
1990, at E26.
50. SeeSchroedel & Peretz, supra note 49, at 340 (discussing feminist response to the vilifi-
cation of pregnant drug abusers). The authors contend that because of the emotional
response to the plight of crack babies, feminists have accepted rather than criticized the views
of mainstream media, health care professionals, and politicians, that mothers, and not fathers,
are to blame. See id. at 341-42. The authors suggest that the feminist response to the problem
of crack babies is directly contradictory to their response to other "fetal protection" laws, such
as workplace exclusions of pregnant women. See id. at 342.
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treatment under the law rather than fetal protection would have
more significance for women because it would not devalue autono-
mous, adult women as human beings by subordinating their rights to
those of the unborn while men are not similarly subordinated.
Currently, legislatures are free to draft precisely worded criminal
laws aimed at prosecuting pregnant women, thus leaving no room for
a court to interpret such laws other than in a way which subordinates
women's rights. For instance, several states have recently enacted
laws requiring physicians who suspect that a woman used drugs dur-
ing pregnancy to perform toxicology tests and report the results to
the local welfare agency." Other states have altered their child abuse
laws to include prenatal drug exposure in their definition of harm to
a child. Many states prosecute mothers or remove newborns from
the home based solely on a positive drug test."' Such laws are not
immune from constitutional attack;' however, a woman should not
falsely believe that the threat of prosecution no longer exists simply
because the prosecutions discussed above failed.
a. A Common Sense Analysis of the Wisdom of Prosecuting Pregnant
Women
Feminist concerns regarding fetal protection laws are first, that a
pregnant woman's interests are deemed subordinate to the interests
of the fetus; and second, that men are not similarly subordinated, al-
though the rationale for subordinating women is equally applicable
51. See Chavkin, Walker, & Paone, supra note 40, at 306 & n.57 (citing ABA CENTER ON
CHILDREN AND THE LAW, DRUG EXPOSED INFANTS AND THEIR FAMILES: COORDINATED RESPONSES
OF THE LEGAL, MEDICAL, AND CHILD PROTECTION SYSTEM 73, 73-80 (1990)). The ABA report
cited in Chavkin, Walker, & Paone lists states with mandatory reporting statutes and excerpts
relevant provisions. The provision types include reporting laws, civil prosecution laws, criminal
prosecution laws, and welfare laws. See id. Listed are: Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Utah, and the District of
Columbia. See id&; see also In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (holding
that the best interests of the child outweighed the mother's interest in confidentiality regarding
drug treatment).
52. Chavkin, Walker, & Paone list the states that target pregnant women for prosecution.
Included are: Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma.
and the District of Columbia. See Chavkin, Walker, & Paone, supra note 40, at 308.
53. See Chavkin, Walker, & Paone, supra note 40, at 305-06 (discussing state theories of
prosecution). One theory of prosecution justifies intervention based on harm caused to the
newborn because of the mother's drug use during pregnancy. See id Another theory views
prenatal drug use as an indicator of possible future harm to the child, such as abuse and ne-
glect by the mother, thus justifying state intervention. See id
54. See Chavkin, Walker, & Paone, supra note 40, at 307 (noting the constitutional issues
raised by these statutes). One constitutional issue is equal protection, because of the discrimi-
natory impact of these laws on poor, black women. See id. A second issue is due process, in
cases where women are not informed of the tests being performed on them. Se id.
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to men because men's drug use may also harm the fetus.55 The sub-
ordination of women, then, is two-tiered. On the first level, women's
interests must give way to state-defined fetal interests. On the second
level, women discover that society does not expect men to subjugate
themselves in the same way it expects women to subjugate them-
selves. Both social hierarchy and fetal protection laws place men at
the top, fetuses in the middle, and women at the bottom. This struc-
ture indicates that fetal protection goals are not the true basis for
these laws. If they were, fetuses, not men, would be at the top of the
hierarchy and, conceivably, men and women would share the subor-
dinate position.'
A careful and reasoned consideration of the state's asserted interest
in protecting fetal life and preventing birth defects reveals some in-
consistencies which suggest that the state may be less committed to
fetal protection than it purports to be." First, incarcerated pregnant
women are far more likely to experience miscarriages than the gen-
eral population of pregnant women." Additionally, pregnant women
in prison are unlikely to receive adequate medical or prenatal care.
Therefore, attempting to protect fetal life by incarcerating pregnant
women is misguided at best.
Second, and more important for purposes of comparison, one re-
cent study found that cocaine can bind to sperm, possibly carrying
the cocaine to the ovum and damaging the embryo before implanta-
tion.' Other research shows that alcohol, tobacco, and illegal drugs
55. See infra notes 60-63; Children of Fathers Who Smoke More Likely to Get Cancer, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Dec. 16, 1996, available in 1996 WL 4454134 (reporting on a study showing that fathers'
smoking damages their sperm and therefore increases their children's risk for developing
childhood cancer); see generallyJacqueline Berrien, Pregnancy and Drug Use: The Dangerous and
Unequal Use of Punitive Measures, 2 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 239, 246 (1990) (noting that men have
not been prosecuted for their drug use which may harm a fetus, for abusing pregnant women,
or for engaging in harmful sexual intercourse with pregnant women; also, men, unlike women,
have not been required by employers to avoid exposure to chemicals known to damage
sperm).
56. See generally Siegel, supra note 37, at 335-58 (discussing gender bias in fetal-protective
regulation); MaryJo Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1045 (1992) (discussing the many ways the law has created or is based upon the hierar-
chies between men and women).
57. For a psychologically-based account of society's characterization of this issue, see
Sherry F. Colb, Words That Deny, Devalue, and Punish:Judicial Responses to Fetus-Envy?, 72 B.U. L.
REV. 101 (1992).
58. See Schroedel & Peretz, supra note 49, at 350-51 (discussing research on miscarriage
rates among female inmates).
59. See Schroedel & Peretz, supra note 49, at 350-51 (discussing the quality of prison prena-
tal care).
60. See Paternal-Fetal ConJlic HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 3 (discussing recent
research on the effect of drug use on sperm).
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have adverse effects on sperm." This research on male contributions
to fetal health is both limited and rarely publicized although men
comprise a large majority of drug addicted individuals,62 are more
likely to use a variety of drugs, and abuse alcohol more frequently.'
The effects of a mother's drug ingestion after conception, however, is
a ripe field for research and publicity.' Despite the general societal
concern for the plight of crack addicted babies, society has not con-
sidered the effects of male exposure to drugs a topic important
enough to warrant large scale medical research.' Thus, although a
father's drug use may have seriously impaired the quality of his
sperm and may in turn cause birth defects, he suffers no threat of
criminal sanction based exclusively on his reproductive conduct.'
This is not to suggest that based on available research one could ar-
gue that men and women are similarly situated with regard to
contributions to fetal health. Rather, feminists should explore and
analyze the disparities in the research and in the regulation of male
and female reproductive capacities to begin development of a more
equitable approach to the pregnancy problem.
61. See Schroedel & Peretz, supra note 49, at 343 (summarizing research on harm to
sperm); Children of Fathers Who Smoke More Likely to Get Cancer, supra note 55 (reporting on a
study showing that fathers' smoking damages their sperm and therefore increases their chil-
dren's risk for developing childhood cancer).
62. See Schroedel & Peretz, supra note 49, at 343 (asserting that the comparative lack of
research on "male fetal abuse" is the result of gender bias); Devra Lee Davis, Gladys Friedler,
Donald Mattison, and Robert Morris, Male Mediated Teratogenesis and Other Reproductive Effects:
Biologic and Epidemiologic Findings and a Plea for Clinical Research, 6 REPROD. TOXIcOLOGY 289,
289 (1992) (explaining that the absence of research on male-mediated birth defects from ex-
posure to toxins is the result of exclusive focus on maternal exposure); Stephen R. Kandall and
Wendy Chavkin, llicit Drugs in America: History, Impact on Women and Infants, and Treatment
Strategies for Women, 43 HASNGS L.J. 615, 629-30 (1992) (summarizing results of medical re-
search on drug use during pregnancy).
63. SeeSchroedel & Peretz, supra note 49, at 343.
64. See, e.g., Schroedel & Peretz, supra note 49, at 338-39 (discussing the extensive coverage
the New York Times has given to fetal abuse). The authors report that during 1989, 1990, and
1991, the New York Times printed 34 articles dealing with fetal abuse. All of the articles ad-
dressed the problem as one concerning women's "lifestyle choices." During the same period,
the New York Times did not print any articles regarding how men's "lifestyle choices" affected
fetal health. See id. at 338-39; see, e.g., Sharon Begley, Hope for "Snow Babies," NEVSWEEK, Sept.
29, 1997, at 62 (reporting that presumptions about babies born to women who used cocaine
during pregnancy may be incorrect and that those babies may grow up with fewer disadvan-
tages than previously assumed).
65. See Schroedel & Peretz, supra note 49, at 338-39, 343 (commenting that no media ex-
posure is given to male behavioral effects on sperm and asserting that the few medical studies
that reveal such effects are "dismissed as 'nonsense'").
66. See, e.g., Paternal-Fetal Conjic supra note 60, at 3 (discussing recent research on the ef-
fects of drug use on sperm). The idea that men could be prosecuted for their drug use as it
affects reproductive conduct is dismissed outright. See id.
EXPANDING FEMINIST IMAGINATION
Third, if a man impregnates a woman he knows to be addicted to
drugs, society does not impose any obligation on him whatsoever re-
garding the health of the fetus, although he has knowingly risked
creating a drug-affected fetus. A father's legal obligation to the fetus
begins, if at all, only after the fetus is born alive. 7 This lack of state
involvement before conception could be justified because of the im-
practicality of identifying and regulating potential fathers.
Nonetheless, if the state were truly interested in fetal health, it could
regulate male sexuality through mandatory contraception until the
male finds a suitable sexual partner with whom he would father a
healthy child. In our society, this is an unlikely scenario. Interest-
ingly, however, society does pass judgment on women's reproductive
choices and regulates them to a much greater extent than it does
men's choices.
Finally, consider the government-required warnings in bars and on
cigarette and alcohol packaging advising women of the risks these
products pose to fetal life.' These regulations presuppose that only
women should be concerned with fetal life and that pregnant
women, not fathers or society at large, bear the responsibility for
producing healthy offspring. Imagine a cigarette warning advising
men that cigarette smoke may damage sperm, causing stillbirths and
learning disabilities.69 This warning would carry the implicit message
that men should alter their conduct because of their reproductive
capacity. Applied to women, this message is accepted as practical;
applied to men, it is a source of humor. As one commentator wrote,
"Could a man be arrested in Florida for delivering drugs to a minor
via - ? Oh, never mind.""
The socially ingrained notion that the mother is more responsible
than the father for the health of a fetus because she carries it inside
67. At least three states impose a legal obligation upon the father, along with the mother,
to support the minor child. Se, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. IAw § 12-204 (1984 and Supp.
1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1-2 (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE § 48A-1B-1 (1996). None of
these states impose a legal obligation on the father before birth.
68. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (Supp. 1997). The federal government requires all cigarette
packages to have one of four warnings, two of which directly address pregnant women:
"SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema,
and May Complicate Pregnancy" and "SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking by Pregnant
Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low Birthweight." Id. Alcohol labels
also warn women that drinking alcohol while pregnant may cause low birthweights. Part of the
warning on a bottle of Corona Extra Beer reads, "GOVERNMENT WARNING: (1) According
to the Surgeon General, women should not drink alcoholic beverages during pregnancy be-
cause of the risk of birth defects."
69. Research does in fact indicate that this is true. See Paternal-Fetal Conflic4 supra note 60,
at 3.
70. Paternal-Fetal ConJfiCt supra note 60, at 3.
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her body is, at least partially, refuted by statistics which show that
men are more likely to batter a pregnant woman than a non-
pregnant woman, and that the battery is often aimed at the fetus."
Accordingly, a social policy of true fetal protection would require
criminalization of certain male conduct in relation to a fetus.n Spe-
cifically, a man who intentionally causes the death of or injury to a
fetus could be prosecuted under special criminal laws aimed at fetal
protection."
Clearly then, a societal commitment to fetal protection certainly
cannot explain these obviously gender-based distinctions. If society
were actually committed to the protection of fetal life, it would seem
logically and morally acceptable to impose some sort of regulation on
both pre-conception and post-conception male behavior that dam-
ages fetuses. Taken to its full extent, a true fetal protection policy
would allow the state to regulate both female and male reproduction
71. SeeSchroedel & Peretz, supra note 49, at 343-46 (providing a summary of research).
72. At least one commentator has advocated the adoption of such measures. See Parness,
supra note 49, at 912-18 (proposing methods for holding "expectant fathers" accountable for
their actions regarding the welfare of the fetus). The author urges that "a few well-considered
prosecutions" of pregnant fathers would serve the goal of fetal protection. Id- at 915. Many of
the author's proposals are straightforward applications of neutral principals; however, his pri-
mary concern is protection of fetal life, not equality of the sexes. These two principles are not
necessarily at odds. For instance, providing educational materials to both the mother and the
father about their sex-specific conduct towards the fetus during pregnancy does not appear to
impede women's equal status. The author's suggestion that states should develop special
criminal laws for prosecuting expectant fathers, however, implicitly supports prosecution of
pregnant women for harming their fetuses. This approach is dearly detrimental to women's
equality as it conceptualizes the woman and the fetus as two distinct entities with conflicting
interests, a position that this paper rejects.
73. See People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that the relevant
statute only applied to viable fetuses). Smith choked, kicked, and hit his pregnant wife while
yelling, "Bleed, baby, bleed." His wife later miscarried. See id. at 500; Hollis v. Commonwealth,
652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983) (holding that, for prosecution, the murder victim must be born
alive). Hollis caused his wife to miscarry by forcing his hand up her vagina after telling her he
did not want the baby she was carrying. See id. at 61. But see MINN. STAT. § 609.2661 (1987)
(stating that whoever intentionally causes the death of a fetus is guilty of murder of an unborn
child in the first degree and subject to life imprisonment. This statute does not include the
pregnant woman or her doctor, thereby protecting her right to have an abortion, but does sub-ject others to prosecution for harming her fetus.). In North Dakota, a person is guilty of a Class
A misdemeanor if the person willfully assaults a pregnant woman and inflicts bodily injury
upon the fetus. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17.1-06 (1995). Virginia prosecutes, as a Class Four
felony, third parties, along with the pregnant woman, who administer drugs or other sub-
stances with the intent to destroy the fetus. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71 (Michie 1996). Licensed
doctors are exempted from this law. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-72, 18.2-73; cf. People v. Davis, 19
Cal. Rptr. 2d 96, 100 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting Smith and holding that viability is not an
element in fetacide). Davis' convictions of murder of a fetus during the course of a robbery,
assault with a firearm, and robbery were reversed because of prejudicial error in the jury in-
structions. See id. at 98; State v. Knapp, 843 S.W.2d. 345 (Mo. 1992) (holding that causing the
death of a fetus is causing the death of a "person" within the meaning of the involuntary man-
slaughter statute). While driving drunk, Knapp caused an automobile collision with a pregnant
woman, killing the fetus. See id. at 346.
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prior to conception. The state might also require men and women
who prove to be unfit parents to take mandatory birth control, a
seemingly alarming possibility. As previously discussed, states have
promulgated each of these types of laws with one alteration-they are
directed exclusively at women.' Notably, when directed at men,
these laws sound like preposterous invasions of privacy and abuses of
state power. The absence of proposals to apply such laws to men, or
even serious societal debate about their efficacy, works to maintain
the status quo of male control over female reproduction. For this
reason, feminists must start exploring the assumptions that support
these inequalities.
2. Workplace Regulations
Like the legislatures and courts that argue for criminal prosecution
of pregnant women, companies that expose their workers to health
risks often cite fetal protection goals as a basis for discriminating
against women in the workplace.' In 1978, the management of
American Cyanamid Company adopted a fetal protection policy and
informed certain affected women workers that women who did not
undergo surgical sterilization would be fired or transferred to lower
payingjobs.7 1 In response to this policy, Betty Riggs, a twenty-six year
old mother of one who intended to have more children, submitted to
surgical sterilization in order to save her job.' Betty's union sued
American Cyanamid, arguing that the policy constituted a hazard
within the meaning of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 7 The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held that the policy was not a hazard because women were able to
choose whether to undergo sterilization and therefore were not ex-
posed to the risk in the performance of theirjobs.Y
74. SeeChavkin, Walker, & Paone, supra note 40, at 306,308.
75. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. American Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d
444,446 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (explaining the purpose of the company's policy).
76. See id. at 446. The management extended the deadline for sterilization but never sig-
nificantly altered its policy. See id. (providing a history of the company policy). Approximately
thirty women were employed at the plant; after implementation of the new policy, only seven
jobs were available to fertile women. See id. at 446.
77. Four other women also chose sterilization; two who did not were transferred to lower
paying positions. See id. After Betty underwent sterilization, her job was eliminated. See David
L. Kirp, Fetal Hazards, GenderJustice, and the Justices: The Limits of Equality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV.
101, 105-06 (1992) (recounting worker testimony).
78. See American Cyanamid, 741 F.2d at 444.
79. See id. at 449.
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In 1982, after Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,"8
Johnson Controls, a battery manufacturer, initiated a policy exclud-
ing pregnant women and "all women except those whose infertility
was medically documented,"'" from jobs which exposed them to raw
lead.' As a justification for its policy, the company cited the risk of
lead poisoning to fetuses.' The data the company relied on in for-
mulating this policy also showed that lead poisoning might be passed
to fetuses through lead-exposed sperm." However, men were not ex-
cluded from any jobs based on this data.' As with drug use, the link
between unhealthy fetuses and lead-exposed sperm is more tenuous
because less research has been devoted to it than to maternal expo-
sure to lead.' Additionally, most industries avoid the uncertainty of
the data on sperm by resorting to perceptions of sex roles, for in-
stance by assuming that harm to fetuses naturally occurs during
pregnancy, not prior to conception. s7
80. Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to amend Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 so it would include pregnancy. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k) (1988). The passage of the Act was the culmination of a long series of cases dealing
with workplace benefits, but was passed as a direct response to General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125 (1976), rehjg denied 429 U.S. 1079 (1977), in which the Supreme Court held that an
employer's disability plan that provided non-occupational sickness and accident benefit cover-
age but not pregnancy-related coverage was not a sex-based classification because not all
women become pregnant. GeneralElectric followed an earlier Supreme Court case in which the
Court reasoned that a California disability insurance program that did not pay benefits for
pregnancy and childbirth was not invidiously discriminatory because the program differenti-
ated between pregnant people and non-pregnant people, not between men and women. See
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Thus, the Court concluded, the Equal Protection
Clause was not violated because non-pregnant persons of both sexes received benefits under
the plan. See id. at 496-97. Geduldigillustrates one shortcoming of the current equal protection
approach to gender equality. Not only did the Court's reasoning overlook the reality that only
women become pregnant, but it also overlooked the reality that ony women were denied benefits
based on their unique ability to become pregnant. Thus, while the Court correctly concluded
that both pregnant and non-pregnant people receive benefits, it apparently did not find it rele-
vant that only pregnant people are denied a benefit.
81. International Union v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 192 (1991).
82. See id. at 191.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 198 (holding that the policy violated Title VII because the gender-based clas-
sification was discriminatory).
85. See id. at 188 (describing how the policy was not neutrally applied).
86. See Davis, Friedler, Mattison, and Morris, supra note 62, at 291 (analyzing research on
the effects of exposure to toxins on sperm); Irene Figa-Talamanca, Valene Dell'Orco, Allessan-
dra Pupi, Franco Dondero, Loredana Gandini, Andrea Lenzi, Francesco Lombardo, Patrizia
Scavalli, and Giancarlo Mancini, Fertility and Semen Quality of Workers Exposed to High Temperatures
in the Ceramics Industry, 6 REPROD. ToxIcoLoGY517, 517 (1992) (discussing the results of a study
which found some impairment of sperm quality after exposure to high temperatures).
87. See Kirp, supra note 77, at 113 (commenting on employers' tendency to assume
women's physiology is more relevant to fetal health). As one physician testified: "If you don't
look for a problem, you don't find it." Id. at 118. This sentiment is echoed by Chavkin, Walker,
& Paone, supra note 40, at 289, who state: "The absence of extensive human evidence should be
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One male Johnson Controls employee asked for a three month
unpaid leave of absence in order to father a healthy child.' The
company denied the request and told him he could quit if he was
anxious about passing lead poisoning to his fetus.' Considering that
Johnson Controls was aware of the risk posed to future fetuses
through contaminated sperm,' it is hard to see how the female-only
exclusion policy might rationally be considered a fetal protection
policy. Nonetheless, both the District Court and the Court of Ap-
peals denied the Union's claim that the policy violated the Pregnancy
Discrimination Amendment to Title VII. The Supreme Court of the
United States reversed the Court of Appeals and held that Johnson
Controls' policy did violate Title VII because the company could not
prove that the policy was a bona fide occupational qualification re-
lated to the central mission of the employer's business.'
a. A Common Sense Analysis of Fetal Protection Laws
In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court pointed out that
Johnson Controls was aware that lead exposure might pose a health
threat to both female and male workers and their unborn children.93
Therefore, because women were similarly situated to men with re-
gard to their reproductive health, the Court found no reason why
women, and not men, should be excluded from certainjobs.' In this
regard, the decision seems to support the position that the state, or
an employer, may not legitimately override women's decisions about
the health of her fetus or potential fetus. By extension, the decision
might also stand for the proposition that the woman's interests do
not conflict with those of the fetus.
Additionally, the decision avoided one potential pitfall. It did not
consider the company's purportedly benevolent motive in imple-
menting the policy. Instead, the Court found that it was a facially
interpreted as a deficiency in research rather than an absence of male-mediated adverse repro-
ductive outcomes." Id. at 289.
88. See International Union v.Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187,192 (1991); Kirp, supra note
77, at 116 (explaining thatJohnson Controls dismissed its own research showing that men ex-
posed to high levels of lead posed a risk to any fetus they fathered).
89. SeeKirp, supra note 77, at 116-17 (describing the testimony of male plaintiffs).
90. SeeJohnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 198.
91. Seei/.at187.
92. See id. at 203-04; see also Kirp, supra note 77, at 127 (discussing the Court's bona fide
occupational qualification analysis).
93. SeeJohnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 188.
94. See i at 187.
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discriminatory policy that did not "withhold a benefit from men,
but rather imposed a burden on women.' Although subtle, this
point is important because of the paternalistic tendency of courts to
characterize discriminatory practices against women as benefitsY
Justice Blackmun clearly rejected this line of reasoning when he
wrote, "[c]oncern for a woman's existing or potential offspring his-
torically has been the excuse for denying women equal employment
opportunities.""8 In these ways, the decision does advance the femi-
nist quest for reproductive autonomy.
Although the Court's decision has far-reaching implications for
women's equal employment opportunities, closer scrutiny reveals
that the decision has serious limitations. First, the decision essen-
tially seeks to equalize the situation by applying traditional notions of
formal equality." Once again, women are faced with male-defined
choices, neither of which look very attractive to working women."'
Women workers, just like male workers, may now either continue to
work and expose themselves to toxins, or quit theirjobs. One might
argue that these choices are more desirable than the choice Johnson
Controls originally gave their female workers-quit or become steril-
ized.'01
From a substantive equality perspective, however, the decision fails
because it does not recognize valid differences between men and
women. The Court assumed that it could either provide women with
the same low level of protection afforded to men, or provide them
with no protection at all." From the substantive equality standpoint
advocated here, courts should consider gender differences when in-
95. Id. at 187-88.
96. See id. at 188 (discussing the absence of a malevolent motive).
97. SeeWeinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 636-38 (1975) (deciding a case in which a
benefit was automatically granted to women but denied to men because women were assumed
to be dependent and therefore to need the benefit but men were assumed not to be depend-
ent and therefore not to need the benefit); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 680 (1975)
(requiring a showing that a male spouse was dependent upon his working wife before provid-
ing the male job-related benefits automatically granted to female spouses of working men,
regardless of whether the female spouse was considered dependent upon the male, on the as-
sumption that the woman needed the extra benefits but the man did not).
98. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 211.
99. Seei.
100. See Gary Minda, Title VII At the Crossroads of Employment Discrimination Law and Postmod-
ern Feminist Theoy. United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc. and Its Implications for the
Women's Rights Movement, 11 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 89, 133 (1992) (critiquing the Johnson
Controls rationale from a postmodem feminist perspective).
101. Commenting on Betty Riggs' and others' decision to become sterilized, Judge Bork
stated, "I suppose that they were glad to have the choice." Kirp, supra note 77, at 129.
102. SeeJohnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 187.
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terpreting discriminatory statutes. They should not, however, assign
social values to those differences or force women to be more like
men in order to have legally cognizable interests.
Because of this judicial myopia, the Johnson Controls Court did not
consider the underlying issue of occupational health and safety,
which affects both men and women."3 For instance, the Court could
have required Johnson Controls to equalize the treatment of men
and women by not exposing either to harmful levels of lead. John-
son Controls would then have had the choice to either develop safer
ways of working with lead or shut down that part or all of its opera-
tion. Johnson Controls would have made this decision based on its
best commercial judgment Ironically, because Johnson Controls
discriminated only against its female workers, the nature of the law-
suit itself provided the basis for allowing it to continue its unsafe
practices.
Although protecting potential life is a worthwhile goal by many
people's standards, states have sought to achieve this goal in invidi-
ously discriminatory ways, leading to the subordination of women."'
Because of the under-inclusiveness of state attempts at fetal protec-
tion, these policies have arguably produced only marginal effects on
the well-being of fetuses."5 Thus, women's equality has been sacri-
ficed for an ill-defined social goal and misguided methods of
achieving that goal.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
To REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
The current feminist focus on abortion poses two crucial obstacles
to women's equality. First, it diverts feminists from questioning the
basic assumption that men contribute less meaningfully to reproduc-
tion and fetal health, allowing these important issues to go
unaddressed. Second, focusing on abortion introduces another en-
tity - the fetus - into the analysis. The existence of the fetus not
only makes the issue emotionally and morally charged, but also gives
the state an "interest" which ostensibly justifies its involvement in the
woman's pregnancy. No comparable situation exists in which a fa-
103. See id.
104. SeeWendy W. Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Pro-
tection with Employment Opportunity Coals Under Title VII, 69 GEO. LJ. 641 (1981) (discussing
employment policies that protect the fetus but discriminate against women).
105. See id. at 657 (asserting that a pregnant woman can be exposed to toxic substances
through contact with an exposed male worker).
106. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 148 (1973) (discussing the state's interest in safeguard-
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ther's rights and interests are balanced against that of his fetus even
though he has contributed equally to its creation.
To achieve the feminist goal of substantive equality, analysis of re-
productive rights must begin before a fetus is created, at the point
when men and women are truly equal reproductive beings. This ap-
proach attempts to reduce the analysis to a straightforward
comparison of male and female reproductive rights, before a fetus
exists. The central thesis of this approach is that prior to the concep-
tion of a fetus, the state may not regulate male and female
reproductive behavior to differing degrees. In short, because the
state does not regulate male contributions to reproduction, it cannot
legitimately regulate the female analog.
A. Recognizing the Male Contribution to Reproduction and Fetal Health
Much of the regulation of female reproductivity is carried out un-
der the guise of fetal protection."° Whether or not this objective is
legitimate, it has subordinated women by denying them equal protec-
tion under the law, relegating them to the less powerful private
sphere, and subjecting them to undue state involvement in decision-
making.'" Fetal protection rationales are based on the largely unex-
plored premise that women contribute more significantly to fetal
health than men. Contrary to this assumption, however, research in-
dicates that male exposure to controlled substances and toxins is
harmful to fetuses.'" Additionally, men can and do intentionally
harm fetuses by physically abusing the mother. ' The state does
nothing to prevent these types of fetal harms specifically as fetal harms.
In a system devoted to achieving substantive equality between the
sexes, this under-inclusiveness would be impermissible. Feminists
ing a woman's health and in protecting potential life); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 833 (1992) (explaining that the state has an interest in potential human life which allows
the state to regulate or proscribe abortion).
107. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833 (1992) (granting the state the right to restrict abortion be-
cause of its interest in protecting potential life).
108. See id (recognizing a state interest in fetal life earlier in the pregnancy and thus fur-
ther limiting a woman's right to obtain an abortion).
109. See International Union v. Johnson Controls, 680 F. Supp. 309, 310 (E.D. Wis. 1988)
(stating that there is dispute as to whether there is a significant risk of harm to the fetus from
lead exposure and whether that risk, if it exists, is substantially confined to females as opposed
to males); Schroedel & Peretz, supra note 49, at 343 (summarizing research showing that alco-
hol, tobacco, and illegal drugs harm sperm). CompareJohnson Controls, 680 F. Supp. at 311
(setting forth Professor Legator's statements that lead poses a threat to both men and women
and that lead probably causes a genetic lesion during spermatogenesis), with id. at 310 (relating
that expert wituess Dr. Scialli is aware of no studies indicating that male blood lead levels of up
to 50 micrograms result in any abnormalities in offspring).
110. See supra note 73.
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must critically examine these assumptions which underlie much of
the social control over women's reproductive autonomy.
In order to achieve equality for women, feminists must exercise
their imaginations to expand the reproductive rights analysis to rec-
ognize the male contribution to reproduction. One danger of this
recognition is that one could use it to justify a correlating expansion
of father's rights. The approach advocated here avoids this danger,
because it only requires the law to recognize that males do in fact pos-
sess reproductive functions that are not regulated by the state, which,
in turn, should lead not to an increase in fathers' rights, but to a de-
crease in state regulation of women's reproduction. That is, because
the rationale behind this approach focuses on achieving equal power
for women, it does not support the notion of an increase in male in-
volvement in women's reproductive lives.
Fathers' rights must not be broadened because to do so would jus-
tify the imposition of fathers' judgment on women's pregnancy-
related decisions, thereby threatening women's reproductive auton-
omy. By contrast, merely exposing the equal contributions of men to
reproduction and fetal health destroys the myth of women's greater
contribution to fetal health prior to conception. This exposure de-
stroys the basis for the current rationale for treating women
differently based solely on their ability to become pregnant In short,
the state has no legitimate basis for regulating only half of the poten-
tially reproductive beings.
It bears repeating that this approach is offered only as a starting
point for limiting state involvement in reproduction. After concep-
tion, however, any defensible theory must address the existence of
that third entity - the fetus. Given the advocacy of state neutrality
argued for up to this point, what rationale exists for any regulation of
abortion? The next section suggests some principles which may be-
gin to answer this question in a way more meaningful than privacy
and equal protection solutions have offered.
B. The Limits of State Involvement in Pregnancy Related Decisions
Under this proposal, medical regulations of pregnancy would not
be immediately suspect, but the state must offer an articulable reason
for any such law. The state has a legitimate interest in promoting
public health and therefore may regulate medical procedures."'
111. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-561 (1996) (allowing a suit for medical malpractice if the
doctor did not obtain the patient's consent before rendering health care); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, § 2905 (West 1996) (outlining the circumstances under which consent to medical treat-
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Health regulations should consider the uniqueness of pregnant
women. To do otherwise is to deny reality. However, the state must
place limitations on the parameters of this power. Accordingly, this
proposal suggests that the state may not assert the protection of fetal
life as a basis for regulations, as it does under the current regime.
This proposed restriction against state-enforced fetal protection
measures prevents the state from diminishing pregnant women's
rights by balancing them against the purported interests of her fetus.
A pregnant woman, of course, is free to consider the health of her fe-
tus paramount to her own health or personal concerns. In the
'interests of women's equality, this must be a personal decision, made
only by the mother and whomever she chooses to involve."' Fetal
health must no longer be achieved through state-enforced prioritiza-
tion of rights, but rather through a recognition that maternal and
fetal health are inextricably intertwined, because in most cases, a
mother's health is not at odds with fetal health.
1. Abortion Regulations
In order to promote women's equality, abortion regulations must
consider only the health of the mother, not the fetus. Because of the
emotional impact of abortion, the definition of maternal health must
include mental health."' For instance, based on the evidence of the
harm some women suffer from undergoing abortions, physicians may
exercise their independent medical judgment and choose to advise
patients about these potential emotional harms."4 Likewise, physi-
ment is not necessary); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.097 (1996) (setting forth the procedures to be
used to obtain informed consent from patients).
112. In this respect, at least, this proposal is similar to the common law of abortion, which
deferred to the mother'sjudgment by criminalizing abortion only after "quickening," the point
when the mother perceived fetal movement. See Siegel, supra note 37, at 281-82. Prior to
quickening, the law considered the fetus to be part of the mother. See generally Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 135 (1973). By all indications, prior to the Civil War, abortion was never consid-
ered a homicide, nor was it firmly established as a crime. See Siegel, supra note 37, at 281-82.
113. Earlyjudicial decisions concerning abortion included psychological well-being in their
definitions of maternal health. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191-92 (1973) (approving a
statute which requires the physician to consider physical and psychological factors). The Roe
Court explicitly considered the psychological harms of unwanted pregnancies. See Roe, 410 U.S.
at 153 (discussing the harms of forced maternity). The Casey decision significantly curtailed
these protections, allowing the state to go so far as to show the woman literature describing the
fetus and encouraging the woman not to have an abortion, in spite of the documented harms
of both unwanted pregnancies and the woman's perception of the fetus as a "baby." See
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883-84 (1992); see also Kolbert & Miller, supra note
31, at 153 (describing the great degree of state involvement in abortion decisions after the Ca.
sey decision).
114. See Steinberg, supra note 10, at 490-92 (listing factors placing women at risk for post-
abortion trauma).
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cians may advise women about the likelihood of emotional harm
from experiencing an unwanted pregnancy. "5 A woman, however,
must make the final decision about whether to undergo the proce-
dure, just as she would be required to do for any other medical
decision.
This proposal alters the current state of the law which allows states
to make blanket abortion regulations, practically rendering the abor-
tion right nonexistent and limiting physicians' ability to exercise
their medical judgment."6 This approach respects women's judg-
ment and allows every woman's internal moral standards to govern
her decisions of whether and when to terminate her pregnancy. It
does not assume that every woman would agree that late term abor-
tions are repugnant or immoral, while it still allows the inherent
ambiguities in defining when a fetus becomes a person. In short, it
treats women as autonomous, responsible individuals while recogniz-
ing the distinctiveness of the abortion right.
2. Regulating Pregnancy
Similarly, if the mother intends to carry the fetus to term, the state
may not impose its judgment on the mother's pregnancy-related de-
cisions. Additionally, the state may not implement laws that consider
the fetus a separate entity from the mother whose interests contradict
her own. These restrictions would largely preclude fetal protection
as a basis for criminal sanctions against pregnant women who use
drugs, as well as precluding state endorsement of workplace regula-
tions designed to protect fetal life.
Feminists should encourage a societal recognition that what is
good for the mother is most often good for the fetus. Accordingly,
resources should not focus on punishing pregnant women or limit-
ing their employment-related options, but rather on providing
resources which enable pregnant women to understand the effects
their actions have on their fetuses. In practical terms, this would
mean a shift from condemning and prosecuting pregnant drug users
to providing meaningful drug use prevention programs and birth
control options. Additionally, government and industry should focus
on providing safe workplaces, rather than expecting women alone to
115. Women who experience unwanted pregnancies are at greater risk for depression and
being physically abused. See Brown & Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1332 (summarizing research
on the harms of unintended pregnancy). Also, both women and men risk economic hardship,
the dissolution of relationships, and failure to attain personal goals. See id. at 1332.
116. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
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bear the economic burden of being forced out of employment be-
cause of potential risks to fetuses.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper attempts to initiate a broader strategy to the pregnancy
problem than the current focus on the abortion right allows. Focus-
ing on the abortion right has limited the efficacy of the feminist
project in two important ways. It has helped perpetuate the myth
that male contributions to reproduction are legally, medically, and
socially insignificant. This myth constitutes the fundamental basis of
the current social system of reproductive regulation. Additionally, it
has required women to suppress their emotional discomfort with the
abortion right because to acknowledge it would provide ammunition
to those who wish to abrogate the right altogether. This denial has
negatively impacted women as a group and has contributed to mak-
ing abortion the divisive issue it is today. Therefore, feminist
theorists must exercise their powers of imagination to broaden the
scope of analysis, rather than continuing to work within the confines
of the traditional privacy and equal protection doctrines.
Feminist legal theorists have been extremely successful in translat-
ing theories of equality into practical methods of expanding women's
rights under the law. Feminism has improved the quality of life and
increased the range of opportunities available to women, yet the
pregnancy problem remains one of the final obstacles to true equal-
ity. Feminist legal theory is equipped to meet this challenge through
its unique ability to imagine.
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